再用＂上海工厂类比＂来宽容AI烧钱也站不住脚：当年每一分钱投向的是已被验证的电动轿车品类，产能爬坡斜率清晰可见；如今投的是没有落地时间线的Robotaxi和机器人，路径完全不可控，风险是数量级的跃升。

1、米6体育 距离夏窗开启只剩不到两周，球队依然没有负责转会运作的技术总监和体育总监，这对志在重建的米兰来说相当困难。

不过迈尼昂与阿莱格里的门将教练菲利皮建立了深厚的工作关系和个人情谊，阿囧的离职让他备受打击。米6体育公司自己也承认存在“实际控制人及其近亲属与公司之间的多笔资金拆借”等多种财务内控不规范情形，并因此做了会计差错更正。

2、夏季联赛NBA球队新秀表现评级：湖人勇士获A，马刺仅得C

从市场当前的动作来看，卫星互联网、商业遥感、导航增强、空间算力等应用快速发展，全球中低轨卫星进入规模化部署阶段，通信与遥感卫星将持续成为商业发射市场的主力需求。

3、北汽展台现“最强天团”！北京北汽男篮车展送惊喜

从优必选、宇树、智元等头部公司挖来一个核心高管，估值加5000万，招到一个名校博士，估值加1000万。

4、CBA形势大乱！广东令人失望，新疆山西都输球，山东机会来了

（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

5、17投2中，命中率11.8%！年薪破亿的后场组合？历史上未有成功先例

固态电池国标落地、欧盟电池护照进入倒计时，合规能力正在成为新的入场券。

那个时段，梅西传球成功率虽是百分之百，可他只触球七次，其中四次是传球。

2026年美加墨世界杯是首次扩军至48队，本届世界杯已经诞生四强，有意思的是世界杯历史首次出现世界排名前四的球队会师半决赛，真是一滴水分也没有，足坛最强的四支国家队角逐2026世界杯的决赛名额。

6、湖人休赛期大换血：佩林卡操作能否赢得球迷信任？

拓竹把这件事做成了。

花几千块钱，在一两年的换机周期里，没人耗得起。

7、落选秀出身，却在夏联场均22+3+2，湖人留下他吧，他值得一份双向合同

他先是为恩佐的扳平球送出助攻，随后又用右脚兜出一道精准传中，让劳塔罗头球完成绝杀。

他在冬窗加盟之初的表现可圈可点，包括1月份对阵莱切打入制胜球，但之后却鲜有亮眼表现，在连续对阵都灵和那不勒斯首发但毫无建树之后，德国人的出场顺位已下滑到与希门尼斯同一水平。

8、津媒：目前津门虎队中人员比较齐整，此前受伤的石炎已经恢复

他面对的是一个被专利悬崖折磨得筋疲力尽的组织，一个被诺和诺德远远甩在身后的GLP-1赛道，和一个刚刚在阿尔茨海默病领域遭遇惨败的研发管线矩阵。

比赛预测与看点 综合来看，乌拉圭在整体实力、中场控制、个人能力方面都占据明显优势，尤其是巴尔韦德领衔的中场，对沙特形成碾压级优势。

(文 | 公司观察，作者 | 周健 ，编辑 | 曹晟源)“三年前和我们一同拿到融资的很多公司，现在已经有不少退出了市场。

9、队报：穆帅希望像当年执教C罗那样，把姆巴佩打造成超级核心

与他搭档锋线的是曼城前锋马尔穆什，这位年轻前锋速度快、冲击力强，是埃及反击的一把尖刀。

当战术设计无法为球星划分清晰的边界时，纸面实力便如流沙般失去了承载能力，最终在淘汰赛中被战术纪律更为严明的对手淘汰。

10、为文班拼了！美媒送马刺3换1交易方案：割爱凯尔登再搭首轮换超六

三支全部降级的赔率不超过2比1，而三支全部保级的赔率高达28比1。

他还明确提出了率队重返欧战的宏愿："这是一个目标，但实现目标需要做对很多事情。

1、23+7后23+8+5！德明抡臂大风车展现天赋 篮网耐心培养终获回报

他第一段实习在小公司做数据标注：活儿沾边但不够核心，导师倒是真带，成果只能说"做了标注"，背书平平，还得自己倒贴。

2、NBA历史“最水”状元，夸梅布朗才排第6，奥登第3，第一名场均4分

这种时间错配，导致锂价暴跌阶段，公司原料成本被锁定在高位，陷入“售价下跌、成本居高、越卖越亏”的被动局面。

3、36氪首发

绝大多数产品创意是由一线的人推出来的，而不是由高管的roadmap驱动的。对话37岁清华毕业生三战高考圆梦北大：肯定要把8年读完，贴年龄标签，是想给中年人力量但独家运营权也存在天然悖论：品牌越成功，品牌方自己下场直营的动力就越强。

4、【多图回顾】澳网有自己的“全明星” ：杰伦上演一动不动、辛纳阿卡观赛化身表情帝

如今看来，这个预期要落空了。

5、国足新一期集训已敲定，4个热身对手浮出水面，一队最具锻炼价值

但现实是残酷的，亚沙里不仅没能展现出在瑞士联赛时的灵气与掌控力，反而在对抗和节奏上完全跟不上意甲的要求，如今他的出场顺位已经排在了里奇之后。

6、世预赛男篮必出线？混血两兄弟拒省队征召 之前三年打琼斯杯挣钱

连续三次在半决赛被西班牙淘汰，这已经不能用偶然来解释。

全场第十二脚射正、总计第二十脚射门，而阿根廷那边，仍然挂着零，梅西更是全场隐身。

而在2025-26赛季初，巴萨曾在约翰·克鲁伊夫体育场进行过两场联赛，随后在蒙特惠奇完成了三场联赛和两场欧冠比赛，最终重返翻修后的诺坎普球场。

7、腾讯AI，翻身了吗？

只有失败成本可承受、成功路径可解释、市场定价可能存在偏差，才具有凸性投资意义。

一旦这一步完成，两家俱乐部之间的谈判预计会迅速推进。

8、男子错过出口听信朋友劝说在高速上倒车 交警：记12分罚款200元

相比之下，阿根廷（15.61%）与英格兰（14.55%）分列三四位，而挪威（5.98%）与瑞士（2.90%）则构成了第二梯队。

除此之外，赵晋荣还有一个笨办法：把子公司开到客户门口。

与此同时，Vaibhav Taneja 也在电话会上说，公司当前处于「大规模投资周期」，2026 年及以后运营费用将持续上涨。

而曾经的绝对主力纯电动客车已退至第五位。